Following the dot-com boom and bust, the media has gone from "dot-coms don't have to make a profit" to a tale of "dot-coms can't make a profit," with a slightly more sophisticated variant, "pure Internet plays can't make a profit."

All three statements are incorrect. What the reporters – and a lot of business people, including successful ones – don't realize is how finely tuned successful businesses are to their place and time.

Ninety-five percent of the first-wave dot-coms failed? Why should they have expected otherwise? Take a look at your local auto repair shop. It is not particularly difficult to make a profit in auto repair. Diagnosis can be tough, and dealing with customers can be tough. Otherwise it is a fairly straightforward business. Anyone willing to be a bit more conscientious than average, and willing to treat customers like human beings, can achieve profitability.

The apparent ease of success, however, is hugely dependent on the pre-built playing field. An auto repair shop operates in a narrow niche of a finely tuned industry. Before auto repair could succeed, cars had to be invented. John D. Rockefeller had to create a gas distribution system. Henry Ford had to sell the American public on cars. Suburbs had to be built so that people couldn't get along without cars. Manufacturers had to build them so they break down. (No, they don't have to. It's an economic decision.) Efficient parts distribution systems had to be created. Missing any of those elements, your local auto shop would go out of business.

Selling over the Internet is a radically new playing field.

This does not mean an ecommerce business should be radical from A to Z. On the contrary, it means that an e-business should use established business knowledge for all it is worth, to balance out the uncertainty of the new playing field. As witnesses to history (we've watch San Francisco Bay dot-coms auger in by the dozens), we will state flatly that success depends on more than a good web site and lots of visitors. It also depends on getting the back end right.

Case in point: The used bookseller ABE.com, with no venture capital, is presently slaughtering the VC-funded S.F. company Alibris. ABE.com did a lot of things right on the web. They put up a plain, user-friendly web site that delivered what the customers wanted: a good selection of used books at good prices.

But they did even more things right at the back end. For one, they left the books right where they were, sitting in low-rent used bookstore space; Alibris took possession of the books, piling up warehouse rental costs, labor costs, and doubling their shipping costs. ABE.com acted modestly, an appropriate stance in the quiet world of used bookselling; Alibris burned money with splashy advertisements in New Yorker magazine. ABE.com went out of their way to accommodate computer-illiterate used booksellers, by accepting inventory data in virtually any format. And not least, ABE.com answered the telephone, and they were pleasant to customers and suppliers alike.

Though we've seen the phrase "end-to-end e-commerce solutions" so many times it makes our eyes glaze over, it's a real need. Web sites don't work well as a slap-on module; they need to integrate with the human and legacy systems of a business. Hastings can deliver more than a just a first-rate web site; our research department can help your ecommerce business succeed with back end business know-how, such as industry practices, how to lower shipping rates, streamlining order processing and fulfillment, and outsourcing options. There is plenty to know, and our research people know plenty of it. (And if they don't know, they'll say so.)

On the other hand, if you've been in business for 50 years, you probably know the back end better than we ever will. Please see http://www.hastingsresearch.com/services/integrating.shtml, which tells how we can build and integrate web sites and other software systems without messing up your present business model. ("Don't let the tail wag the dog.")